The global resurgence of nuclear discussions, including potential US testing and reported activities by Russia and Pakistan, is prompting a strategic re-evaluation within India. The question of whether it is time for New Delhi to conduct its own thermonuclear tests, a capability claimed after the 1998 Pokhran-II tests, is gaining traction.
India has historically upheld a doctrine of ‘credible minimum deterrence’ and a no-first-use (NFU) policy since 1998, aiming for regional stability. However, recent international developments are challenging the efficacy of this long-standing restraint. Experts are debating if India’s self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing still aligns with its evolving security needs, particularly in light of its nuclear-armed neighbors, Pakistan and China.
While India possesses an estimated 180 warheads, China’s arsenal is projected to reach 1,000 by 2030, and Pakistan’s is also growing. The presence of advanced Chinese missile systems like the DF-41, capable of carrying multiple warheads, adds a layer of strategic complexity.
Resuming nuclear tests would present India with diplomatic risks, potentially jeopardizing its international standing and agreements. Yet, advocates suggest that in a world where major powers are exploring testing, India must ensure its technological edge and validate its most advanced nuclear capabilities. This could involve modernizing warheads for potential MIRV integration and solidifying its long-term deterrence posture in a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape.