The Pakistan army is navigating a period of unprecedented challenges, marked by operational setbacks and growing internal fragility. Multiple recent incidents, including significant troop losses to militant factions it is believed to have previously supported, have exposed its vulnerabilities. The recent accord with the Taliban offers a temporary respite, but its sustainability remains a major concern. The sustained pressure exerted by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has emboldened a spectrum of militant and extremist groups to intensify their operations against the state apparatus. Experts monitoring Pakistan’s security landscape suggest that various organizations share a common objective: the overthrow of the existing government and the establishment of an Islamic regime. Prominent among these are the TTP, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). The LeJ, traditionally involved in sectarian violence targeting religious minorities, is now seen as a potential threat to expand its operational scope. Its past alignments with both the ISKP and TTP raise concerns of renewed collaboration, particularly as these groups recognize the Pakistan army’s current weaknesses. The ISKP, which was previously engaged to counter the Afghan Taliban, may alter its strategic position following the peace agreement, potentially aligning more closely with the LeJ than the TTP, which is thought to have tacit support from the Afghan Taliban. The historical animosity and distinct origins of the ISKP from TTP factions make a unified front improbable. However, intelligence reports indicate that even individual attacks from these groups are expected to escalate significantly in the coming days. Pakistan’s ability to enlist the support of major groups like Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) against these emerging threats is questionable. The JeM’s mixed record with the establishment and its sympathy for the Afghan Taliban and TTP could lead to internal divisions if engaged in anti-TTP operations. The LeT has historically avoided direct confrontation with the state, but past instances, like disagreements over cooperation with the US, revealed potential fault lines within the organization. Simultaneously, ethnic nationalist and secular separatist movements in Balochistan are also capitalizing on the army’s stretched resources, increasing attacks on Chinese assets and military targets, and signaling a heightened resolve for an independent state.
